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 Binders Full of Women & Closing the Gap 
Michael J. Zimmer∗
 
Presidential candidate Mitt Romney used the unfortunate phrase 
of seeking out “binders full of women” to claim that he wanted wom-
en to fill high administrative positions once he became Governor of 
Massachusetts.1  This came in the same period when Marissa Mayer, 
who was in her second trimester, was picked to be the CEO of Yahoo2 
and Anne-Marie Slaughter was writing in The Atlantic that she had to 
leave her position in the State Department because her children 
needed her.3  Cracking through the glass ceiling to top-level positions 
is not only a hot topic in the United States but is in the European Un-
ion as well.  On November 14, 2012, the European Commission 
adopted a proposed Directive that would require EU member states 
to require that boards of large European corporations be made up of 
“40% of the underrepresented gender” for non-executive, outside di-
rector seats.4  If the European Council and Parliament both adopt 
                                                                                                                           
 
∗ Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. My thanks to my research 
assistant, Lisa Dannewitz JD 2014, Francesca Marinelli, Ricercatore di Diritto del Lavoro, Uni-
versità Degli Studi di Milano, and Loyola research librarian Joe Mitzenmacher.  I also want to 
thank my co-authors, Roger Blanpain, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bill Corbett and Hilary Josephs.  As 
always my thanks to Margaret Moses. 
 1 In response to a question in a debate about equal pay for women, Romney said, “I went 
to a number of women’s groups and said, ‘Can you help us find folks?’ and they brought us 
whole binders full of women.”  Romney ‘Binders Full Of Women’ Female Hiring Boast Falls 
Apart, HUFFPOLITICS BLOG (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/10/17/romney-binders-full-of-women_n_1974092.html.  Beyond being rather creepy because it 
could be interpreted as binders on women in the sense of restrictions, his statement was not true.  
Josh Hicks, Fact checking Romney’s ‘binders full of women’ anecdote, THE FACT CHECKER: THE 
TRUTH BEHIND THE RHETORIC BY GLENN KESSLER (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/fact-checking-romneys-binders-full-of-
women-anecdote/2012/10/18/42f4cd38-18cb-11e2-9855-71f2b20 
2721b_blog.html. 
 2 Julia Haskins, Marissa Mayer, Yahoo CEO, Welcomes a Baby Boy, PEOPLE (Oct. 1, 2012, 
4:55 PM), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20635072,00.html. 
 3 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 
2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-
have-it-all/309020/. 
 4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Improving the 
Gender Balance Among Non-Executive Directors of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges and 
Related Measures, at 5, COM (2012) 614 final (Nov. 14, 2012), available at 
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this,5 the Directive will have significant impact on the gender composi-
tion of these boards of directors.  However, it may also impact gender 
equality for employment in these companies and, perhaps, the success 
of the businesses in the market.6 
This paper will discuss the background leading up to the Direc-
tive being proposed, its scope and also how it might work.  Further, 
this paper will attempt to assess its potential impact for gender equal-
ity in the workplace.7  Part I will lay out the backstory and Part II will 
describe what the Directive requires, as well as evaluating how it 
might work.  Part III will attempt to evaluate the potential for this 
Directive to improve gender equality across the workforce of these 
businesses.  Part IV will juxtapose the “positive action” the Directive 
will require with the legal treatment of “affirmative action” in the 
United States.  
I. THE BACKSTORY 
Equality is one of the core values of the EU.8  Since at least 1975, 
the EU has considered issues of gender equality by adopting its first 
Directive requiring equal pay for equal work.9  In 2010, the EU Com-
                                                                                                                           
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0614:FIN:en:PDF [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Directive]. The Proposed Directive is based on Article 157(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
Since the EU is a transnational organization of independent and sovereign nation states, di-
rectives promulgated by the EU require the member states to conform their national laws to the 
requirements laid out in the Directive: “EU directives lay down certain end results that must be 
achieved in every Member State.  National authorities have to adapt their laws to meet these 
goals, but are free to decide how to do so.”  Application of EU Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/directives/directives_en.htm (last updated June 11, 2012). 
 5 Final adoption is by no means a sure thing.  While one EU Commissioner comes from 
each of the 27 member states, Commissioners are charged with acting for the best interests of the 
EU and not as representatives of the member state from which they come.  The EU Council, on 
the other hand, is made up of the representatives of the member states and the European Par-
liament represents the people.  
 6 The Commission justifies the Directive in part based on its instrumentalist function of 
improving gender equality in employment and business success. 
 7 The impact on business success is beyond the scope of this paper, though some reference 
will be made to it. 
 8 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, arts. 2 and 3(3) [hereinafter 
TEU].  According to Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 8, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], the EU should aim to eliminate inequalities 
and to promote equality between men and women in all of its activities.  The first 6 of the 40 
“whereas clauses” that precede and justify the substantive provisions of the Proposed Directive 
trace the history of the EU’s actions vis-à-vis greater gender equality.  See Proposed Directive, 
supra note 4. 
 9 Council Directive 75/117/EEC, of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, 
1975 O.J. (L 45) 19 (EEC) [hereinafter Equal Pay Derivative].  For the later amendments to the 
Equal Pay Directive as well as other EU legislation dealing with gender equality, see Equal Pay, 
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mission included a goal of improved gender equality as part of its Eu-
rope Strategy 2020 to turn the EU into a “smart, sustainable and in-
clusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity, 
and social cohesion.”10  That same year, the Commission also adopted 
a Women’s Charter.11  Following that, the Commission issued a call to 
major corporations to voluntarily improve the representation of 
women on their boards of directors, “Women on the Board Pledge for 
Europe.”12  Because only 24 corporations took the pledge, the next 
step was to consider adoption of what ultimately became the Direc-
tive dealing with mandated gender equality on corporate boards.13  
In March 2012, the Commission issued the “Women in Economic 
Decision Making in the EU: Progress Report,” indicating that women 
made up “just 13.7% of board seats of the largest publicly held listed 
companies in EU Member States.”14   There were only 19 women 
CEOs of the 600 corporations listed on stock exchanges in member 
states in the EU.15  Before the present push for increased gender 
equality on corporate boards, Norway, in 2003, had amended its cor-
porate law by adopting a 40% quota, a goal that was achieved by 
                                                                                                                           
SUMMARIES OF EU LEGISLATION, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_ 
social_policy/employment_rights_and_work_organisation/c10905_en.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 
2008). 
 10 Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, at 3, 
COM (2010) 2020 (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/investing-in-
research-european-commission-europe-2020-2010.pdf.  The Proposed Directive is in part justified as 
part of the EU’s growth strategy “to raise the employment rate for women and men aged 20-64 
to 75% by 2020.”  Press Release, European Commission IP/12/1205, Women on Boards: Commis-
sion proposes 40% objective, at 4 (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-1205_en.htm [hereinafter EC Press Release]. 
 11 Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 78 final (Mar. 5, 2010).  In Septem-
ber 2010, the Commission adopted a new “Strategy for Equality between Women and Men,” that 
included a commitment “to improve the gender balance in decision making.” See Strategy for 
Equality between Women and Men: 2010-2015, at 20 (2011), available at 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6568&langId=en. 
 12 Women on the Board Pledge for Europe, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/womenpledge/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 
13, 2013).  For the pledge form companies may complete, see Women on the Board Pledge for 
Europe, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/p_en.pdf. 
 13 EC Press Release, supra note 10, at 4. 
 14 Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress report (2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf [hereinafter Progress 
Report].   From the end of 2003 until January 2012, the representation of women on boards rose 
from 8.5% to 13.7%. Id. at 10-11.  There is striking gender imbalance within the member states, 
with the national average ranging from about 3% to up to 27%.  Id. at 9.  By comparison, women 
hold 16.6% of all board seats in United States corporations.  Catalyst Pyramid: U.S. Women in 
Business, CATALYST (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/us-women-business-0. 
 15 Progress Report, supra note 14, at 12. 
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2006.16  France, Italy, and Belgium have recently enacted legislation 
requiring gender equality on corporate boards; the Netherlands and 
Spain have passed similar legislation but those laws do not include any 
significant sanctions.  Other member states, such as Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Austria and Slovenia, have adopted some measures on gender 
equality for corporate board membership.17  Some, like the United 
Kingdom, adopted purely voluntary programs.18 
The impact of those national laws no doubt explained the pro-
gress that had been made,19 but overall, Viviane Reding, the Vice 
President of the Commission and commissioner for justice, considered 
it inadequate.20  Reding’s opinion was the justification for going for-
ward with a mandatory community-wide effort if real progress was to 
be made within the foreseeable future.  While some member states 
have made real progress, others have fallen far short.  This growing 
difference in the gender composition of the boards among member 
states was seen as interfering with the goal of a single, strong EU-wide 
economy.21  Reding’s original proposal to the Commission would have 
required member states to punish corporations for failing to meet a 
40% goal for non-executive board positions.22  Facing stiff resistance,23 
the Commission initially postponed a vote on that draft, leaving time 
for compromise to overcome at least some of the opposition.24  Finally, 
the full Commission adopted the revised Directive lacking the direct 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 2 n.5.  Norway is not a member state of the EU but 
it is closely associated with it through its membership in the European Economic Area.  See 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA, http://www.efta.int/eea.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).  
 17 Progress Report, supra note 14, at 13.  
 18 Ian Traynor & Simon Goodley, Brussels leaves 40% Quota for Women at Mercy of Mem-
ber States, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/nov/14/eu-
gender-quotas-upto-member-states. 
 19 France initiated its law in January 2011, and the compliance of French corporations 
“accounts for more than 40% of the total EU-wide change recorded between October 2010 and 
January 2012.”  EC Press Release, supra note 10, at 4. 
 20 Without the Directive, it was predicted that the “EU as a whole [was] not expected to 
even achieve 40% of women on boards by 2040.”  Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 9. 
 21 The Commission viewed this increasing divergence as leading “to practical complica-
tions for listed companies operating across borders, notably when establishing subsidiaries or in 
mergers and acquisitions, as well as for candidates for board positions . . . . Only an EU-level 
measure can effectively help to ensure a competitive level-playing field throughout the Union 
and avoid practical complications in business life.”  Id. at 17. 
 22 James Kanter, New European Push for Women in Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/business/global/eu-officials-expected-to-support-new-
quota-proposal.html?_r=0. 
 23 Under the leadership of the United Kingdom, nine member states signed a letter to the 
Commission opposing the Directive.  See Stephen Castle, Proposed Quota for Women in Board-
rooms Is at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at B4.  
 24 James Kanter, Europe Postpones Vote on Gender Quota Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/eu-postpones-vote-on-gender-quota-
plan.html. 
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enforcement power, sending it to the European Council and Parlia-
ment for their adoption.  
II. THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE 
Article 4 (1) sets forth the basic thrust of the Directive by estab-
lishing a requirement, to be met by January 1, 2020, that private cor-
porations incorporated in a member state whose securities are listed 
on any stock market in any EU member state have at least 40% of its 
outside board seats – seats not occupied by executive employees of 
the corporation – filled by the “under-represented sex.”25  There are 
some exceptions from coverage.  Thus, Article 3 provides that the Di-
rective “shall not apply to small and medium-sized enterprises.”26  Fur-
ther, companies with a workforce with less than 10% women are also 
excluded.27  Finally, Article 10 (2) sets a “sunset clause” for the Direc-
tive of December 31, 2028.28 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 24.  Paragraph 1 of Article 4 also requires that the 
goal for “public undertakings” is January 1, 2018.  The 40% figure is justified because it splits the 
difference between the “critical mass” of 30%, which has been found necessary in order to have 
a sustainable impact on board performance and full gender parity (50%).”  Id. at 5.  Paragraph 2 
provides that the actual number of directors of the underrepresented sex is “the number closest 
to the proportion of 40 per cent, but not exceeding 49 per cent.”  Thus, the actual number can be 
below or above the 40% threshold, but “listed companies should not be obliged to appoint 
members of the under-represented sex to half or more of the non-executive positions in order to 
avoid excessive restraints.”  Id. at 12.   
“[T]o avoid discrimination of the initially over-represented sex, listed companies should not 
be obliged to appoint members of the under-represented sex to half or more of the non-
executive board positions.  Thus, for example, members of the under-represented sex should hold 
at least one position on boards with three or four non-executive directors, at least two positions 
on boards with five or six non-executive directors, and at least three positions on boards with 
seven or eight non-executive directors.”  Id. at 19.  The Directive applies to listed companies 
whether or not they are “two-tier,” i.e., with separate management and supervisory boards, a 
unitary system or a hybrid.  Id. at 18.  If all the members of the management board in a two-tier 
system of corporate governance are executive employees of the corporation, then the Directive 
would only apply to the supervisory board and only to its members who were not corporate 
executives.  
 26 Id. at 24.  This exemption may not have much application since small and medium cor-
porations are unlikely to be listed on a stock exchange in the first place. 
 27 Id. at 24-25, para. 6.  The justification for this exemption is not clear since traditionally 
sex segregated jobs would seem to be most in need of greater gender equality on their boards if 
women do bring added value to the overall employment policies of these corporations.  It may 
be the Commission’s thinking that it would be difficult to find qualified members of the under-
represented sex if to be qualified means that the person has worked in the business.  Rather than 
an exemption, a lower target or a longer time to reach it might better serve the overall purpose 
of the Directive.  
 28 Id. at 13, 27.  Presumably, the Directive will no longer be required if the laws of all the 
Member States are harmonized with it within two years of its final adoption pursuant to Article 
8 and have been complied with by corporations as of January 1, 2020.  Presumably, the Commis-
sion is predicting that Member States will not repeal their laws after 2028 and that the practices 
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Rather than requiring that non-complying corporations be pun-
ished, Article 4 (5) establishes that, for companies that have not met 
the goal, a system of merit selection must be implemented.29  For cor-
porations not meeting the goal, appointments must be made “on the 
basis of a comparative analysis of the qualifications of each candidate, 
by applying pre-established, clear, neutrally formulated, and unambi-
guous criteria.”30  Setting the enforcement scheme this way creates a 
significant incentive for corporations to act to meet the goal in order 
to avoid the necessity of adopting a transparent procedure for board 
appointments.  Assuming most corporations would want to maintain 
their existing means of filling board positions without public oversight, 
there is tremendous value to them to fill openings with a sufficient 
number of the underrepresented sex and to fill 40% of the non-
executive board seats without having to make any changes in how 
those appointments were made.  
While Article 5 (1) applies to board members who are executives 
of the company, it only requires that these listed companies “under-
take individual commitments regarding gender-balanced representa-
tion of both sexes among executive directors.”31  According to the 
Commission, requiring all the member states to mandate representa-
tion of women who are not executives, but only requiring some com-
mitment of gender equality for executive members of the board, is 
justified “in order to strike the right balance between the necessity to 
increase the gender diversity of boards on one hand and the need to 
minimize interference with day-to-day management of a company on 
the other hand.”32  The link that the Commission claims between non-
executive and executive board members and gender equality within 
employers is that women non-executive directors will have “positive 
ripple effects for gender diversity throughout the career ladder.”33  By 
limiting the scope of this requirement to board members who are not 
executive employees of the corporation, the Directive appears at most 
to have an indirect effect on the employment of its executives as well 
as on the corporation’s employment in general.  The only direct effect 
will result with the board members who are selected by the employees 
                                                                                                                           
of corporations in appointing non-executive board members will continue in accord with the 
requirement of the Directive. 
 29 See id. at 24.  Corporations, of course, will claim that board positions are already filled by 
merit.  They resist, however, losing their unrestricted discretion to regulate the level of manage-
rial slack that would come with a legally required system of merit where that can expose the 
corporation to criticism and litigation. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 25. 
 32 Id. at 5.  
 33 Id. 
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to positions on supervisory boards, by the codetermination laws of 
countries like Germany, and who are employees subject to the 40% 
goal.34 
Concerns about affirmative action and reverse discrimination, 
which is characterized as “positive action” by the EU, are addressed in 
Article 4 (3), which uses gender as the tiebreaker between two other-
wise equally qualified candidates.35  Priority should be given to candi-
date of the under-represented sex “if that candidate is equally quali-
fied as a candidate of the other sex in terms of suitability, competence 
and professional performance, unless an objective assessment taking 
account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates tilts the bal-
ance in favour of the candidate of the other sex.”36  In Kalanke v. Freir 
Hansestadt Bremen,37 the European Court of Justice had found that a 
provision guaranteeing “women absolute and unconditional priority 
for appointment,” even if done to redress gender inequality, was not 
within the permissible parameters of legal positive action.  Subse-
quently, in Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordhein Westfalen, the ECJ 
qualified Kalanke by approving a rule that, where women were under-
represented in a job category, a tie goes to the woman candidate over 
an equally qualified male candidate “unless reasons specific to an in-
dividual male candidate tilt the balance in his favour.”38  In essence, it 
appears that where there is gender inequality and two candidates are 
equally qualified, affirmative action in favor of the woman can be 
used as the tiebreaker unless something specific about the male can-
didate, presumably not involving qualifications for the job because 
their qualification must be equal, justifies hiring him.39  
                                                                                                                           
 34 The Commission states that those board members not within the coverage of the Direc-
tive are “executives,” not corporate employees.  Id. at 11.  Thus, “employee representatives in 
those Member States where a certain proportion of the non-executive directors can or must be 
appointed or elected by the company’s workforce and/or organization of workers” are within the 
scope of the Directive.  Id.  Where those representatives are employees of the corporation, the 
Directive will apply.  How that will work is left to be determined by the member states.  Id. at 19. 
 35 Paragraph 3 is “necessary to ensure that the objectives comply with the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union concerning positive action.”  Id. at 12.  The Commission 
recognized that the ECJ has “accepted that priority may in certain cases be given to the under-
represented sex in selection for employment or promotion,” and the Directive extends that to 
the appointment of non-executive board members.  Id. at 20.  
 36 Id. at 24. 
 37 Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freir Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. I-03051.  
 38 Case C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordhein Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 6363. 
 39 ROGER BLANPAIN, SUSAN BISOM-RAPP, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, HILARY K. JOSEPH & 
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 457 (2d ed. 2012).  An example of something about a candidate that does not 
implicate job qualifications is unclear.  Perhaps, a man with heavy obligations to provide for 
elderly parents or a disabled child or spouse, where the woman candidate does not face those 
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In paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 4, the Directive creates a way for 
unsuccessful candidates to challenge the appointment decision.  Para-
graph 4 requires that, “on the request of an unsuccessful candidate, the 
qualification criteria upon which the selection was based, the objective 
comparative assessment of those criteria and, where relevant, the con-
siderations tilting the balance in favor of the candidate of the other 
sex,” must be provided to the unsuccessful candidate, whether the 
candidate is a member of the under- or the over-represented gender.40  
Paragraph 5 then provides that a private cause of action to challenge 
the decision in the national judicial system must be available to candi-
dates of the under-represented sex, but not the over-represented sex, 
who were not chosen.41  Further, it provides the claimant the benefit of 
a burden shifting procedure to establish liability: “[W]here an unsuc-
cessful candidate of the underrepresented sex establishes facts from 
which it may be presumed that that candidate was equally qualified as 
the appointed candidate of the other sex, it shall be for the listed 
company to prove that there has been no breach of the rule.”42  Article 
4 (5) provides that the national judicial systems must be available for 
the enforcement of these challenges by unsuccessful candidates of the 
underrepresented sex, typically women.43 It does not require that un-
successful candidates of the overrepresented sex be provided such an 
action.44  Presumably, members of the overrepresented sex who are 
unsuccessful candidates need only be entitled to the information re-
quired by paragraph 4.  The terms of the Directive, however, do not 
require that the member states provide a cause of action to them in 
their national court system.45  Problems of discrimination are raised in 
member states that do not provide a means to challenge board ap-
                                                                                                                           
burdens, might be an example of a situation where the “savings clause” of Hellmut Marschall 
would apply. 
 40 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 24.  The Commission acknowledges that these dis-
closure provisions apply to information concerning “personal data” but that the disclosure re-
quirements are “necessary and, in conformity with the principle of proportionality, genuinely 
meet recognised objectives of general interest.”  Id. at 20-21.  In addition, they are consistent 
with the privacy provisions of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.  Id. at 21. 
 41 Id. at 24-25. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 25. 
 45 However, armed with the information that the corporation is required to provide, an 
unsuccessful candidate of the overrepresented sex might have other venues available outside of 
the national judicial system, from internal corporate grievance procedures to using the informa-
tion to create a public relations challenge for the corporation. 
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pointments.46  While the distinction is phrased in gender-neutral terms 
– referring to over and underrepresented sexes – the distinction would 
cause an adverse impact on men.  
Article 6 (1) requires that sanctions must be made “applicable to 
infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Di-
rective.”47  Paragraph 2 requires that the sanctions must be “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and may include . . . administrative fines 
[and] nullity or annulment declared by a judicial body of the appoint-
ment . . . of non-executive directors.”48  Since fines and annulment of 
the appointment are authorized but not required, it is not entirely 
clear what other remedies would be considered to be “effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive.”  Presumably, tort-type compensatory dam-
ages would potentially suffice.  Article 5 (4) recognizes that national 
“equality bodies” required for employment in Directive 2006/54/EC 
that have jurisdiction over “the promotion, analysis, monitoring and 
support of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on 
grounds of sex”49 in employment are required to have similar jurisdic-
tion over questions of “gender balance on the boards of listed compa-
nies.”50 
In sum, the Directive, if ultimately adopted by the Council and 
the European Parliament, may transform the gender composition of 
corporate boards of listed companies in the EU member states.  If the 
Directive came into effect by the end of 2013, the member states 
would have until the end of 2015 to conform their laws to it.  That 
would leave four years – from the beginning of 2016 to the end of 
2019 – for corporations to which it applies to meet the 40% quota.  
With the listed corporations in some member states already making 
significant progress toward that goal, the largest changes in the gender 
composition of corporate boards would be in member states where 
little progress has so far been made.   About 5,000 companies are 
listed on the stock exchanges of EU member states and would there-
fore be required to comply.51  It is not clear how many outside director 
seats there are on all those corporations, so it is not clear how many 
women directors would need to be in place with full compliance.  Al-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Providing a cause of action for women, but not men, who claim they were discriminated 
against by not being appointed to the corporate board would likely be a basis for claiming sex 
discrimination in the way this cause of action is structured. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 49 Directive 2006/54/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23, 31. 
 50 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 25. 
 51 See Kanter, supra note 22. 
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ready, the European Business Schools Women on Board Initiative has 
identified more than 7,000 highly qualified women in the EU who 
would be ready to assume board positions.52  As for improving gender 
equality in corporate employment more broadly, the question is 
whether corporations with gender integrated boards of directors will 
make corporate decisions that will assist gender equality in employ-
ment generally and to help break the glass ceiling to top management 
positions.  The next section turns to that question. 
III. GENDER INTEGRATED BOARDS AND EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY  
Given the long standing commitment of the EU for gender equal-
ity– simply stated, greater gender equality advances justice even if it 
does not produce gains in employment equality -- there is no need to 
seek justification for the proposed Directive beyond that straightfor-
ward justice claim.53  The Commission, however, tied the justification 
for the Directive to the Europe Strategy 2020, which was aimed at 
making the EU a “smart, sustainable and inclusive economy deliver-
ing high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion.”54  
Thus, the proposed Directive is justified as part of the EU’s growth 
strategy “to raise the employment rate for women and men aged 20-64 
to 75% by 2020.”55  The question is whether increasing gender equality 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 3.  Many more women would be needed to fill all of 
the slots on all the boards of directors.  There is an issue of where companies will find these 
female board members because of the problems they face during their life cycle.  Gender bias 
throughout a woman’s career is cumulative.  Thus, for example, women’s pensions are adversely 
affected not only by wage discrimination, but also by life patterns that take them out of the 
workforce for periods of caregiving (or lead them to work part-time).  Put simply, there may be 
fewer women qualified compared to men in countries where women’s access to top management 
positions is severely limited for a host of reasons.  So, in terms of tie breakers, the question is, at 
least initially, how many ties can one expect there will be?  
One study concerning representation by people of color on corporate boards showed that 
just a few traditionally-qualified people of color were each offered multiple board slots by mul-
tiple corporations.  See Clayon S. Rose & William T. Bielby, Race to the Top: How Companies 
Shape the Inclusion of African Americans on Their Boards in Response to Institutional Pressure, 
40 SOC. SCI. RES. 841 (2011). 
 53 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 856 (2011) (a sufficient argument for diversity is on social and moral grounds rather than 
that board diversity is good for business). 
 54 Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, at 3, 
COM (2010) 2020 (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/investing-in-
research-european-commission-europe-2020-2010.pdf. 
 55 EC Press Release, supra note 10, at 4.  Further, the Directive was also justified as “a key 
element to . . . competing successfully in a globalised economy and ensuring a comparative ad-
vantage vis-à-vis third countries. . . . [G]ender imbalance in the boards of publicly listed compa-
nies in the EU can be a missed opportunity at company level in terms of both corporate govern-
ance and financial company performance.”  Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 3.  This paper 
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on corporate boards will improve gender equality in employment by 
those corporations.  
The first step in answering that fundamental question is to de-
termine whether gender-integrated groups are likely to operate dif-
ferently from gender-segregated ones.  There is a strong case that in 
general they do.  Outside of employment or board membership – 
looking at the decisions by three-judge panels of judges on United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeal – it is clear that having one woman on 
the panel does change the way a panel acts than if the panel was all 
male.56  A study reviewing sex discrimination suits decided in the fed-
eral circuits between 1995 and 2002 showed that men are significantly 
more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff when a woman serves on 
the panel.57  Thus, there is evidence supporting the conclusion that a 
gender integrated decision making body, like the three judge panels of 
courts of appeal, will act differently than one that is all male.58  The 
difference will likely favor women. 
It is also reasonably clear that gender balanced boards of direc-
tors do act differently than ones that are not balanced.  Miriam 
Schwartz-Ziv recently published a very interesting study based on the 
analysis of Israeli corporations that are private, but in which the gov-
ernment holds a substantial equity interest.  Because of government 
investment, these corporations are required to produce detailed min-
utes, she calls them “quasi-transcripts,” of board and board-committee 
meetings.59  What makes this study so potentially powerful is that, 
unlike most studies attempting to assess the effect of gender represen-
tation on the actions of boards of directors, it is based on more than 
only publicly available data.60  The more in depth analysis of these 
                                                                                                                           
will focus on the question whether greater gender equality at the board of directors level is likely 
to lead to improved equality of opportunity in employment for women.  The link of board com-
position to financial performance is beyond this paper.  There is a considerable amount of schol-
arship on that issue. See Symposium, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the 
Gaps, 89 N.C. L. REV. 711 (2011), available at http://www.nclawreview.org/category/archives/89/. 
 56 Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex 
on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010). 
 57 Id. at 402. 
 58 See generally id.  
 59 Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, at 2 (May 7, 2013) available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868033 [hereinafter Does the Gender of 
Directors Matter?] (“For each [of 11 companies], minutes for one year in the period 2007-2009 
are examined – altogether 155 board meetings and 247 meetings of board-committees. These 
document the details of the meetings, including the statements made by every participant in each 
meeting.  Altogether, 2,459 issues were discussed in these meetings.”). 
 60 Id.  It might be argued that this is a small study, limited by the fact that it involves pri-
vate corporations with government investment, and that its conclusions should not be assumed 
to be applicable to private corporations generally.  Its power, however, is based on the granular 
nature of the data that makes it possible to link board actions with corporate performance.  
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meeting minutes gives a clearer basis for determining that the gender 
representation on the different boards is linked to action of some sort 
by the corporation.61  Schwartz-Ziv starts by defining what constitutes 
a gender-integrated board.  Based on prior studies that showed that “a 
critical mass of three women directors . . . will catalyze board active-
ness/performance,”62  she analyzed the minutes of these meetings and 
concluded: 
The empirical results indicate that boards are most active when 
they are relatively gender-balanced – when at least three men 
and three women directors are in attendance, a situation [called] 
a “dual-critical mass.”  Boards with such a dual-critical mass were 
found, in comparison to boards without one, to be approximately 
twice as likely to request further information or an update [from 
management], and also to take an initiative [by proposing some 
corporate action].  These results are driven more strongly by the 
presence of a critical mass of women directors.63 
Because the study was able to look at the “below the surface” data of 
these corporate minutes, Schwartz-Ziv was able to establish the effect 
gender-diverse boards had on corporate performance in the market.  
Return of equity and net profit margins were found to be significantly 
larger in companies that have at least three women directors.64   
  Taken together with the findings pertaining to the work of boards 
below the surface, which document a causal relation in the same direc-
tion, the findings pertain to performance (rather than it being only 
associated with it).65  This study connects corporations having greater 
gender equality on their boards with corporate action, which leads to 
a greater business success than for boards that lacked that equality.  
                                                                                                                           
 61 Prior studies that could only rely on public information about financial performance to 
compare with the gender composition of the board are necessarily inconclusive since there is 
nothing to show what the board did, what decisions that it made.  See Deborah L. Rhode & 
Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference 
Make? (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 89., 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685615 (meta study of more than two dozen empirical 
studies did not convincingly establish any relationship between the gender composition of the 
board and the corporations’ financial performance). 
 62 Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, supra note 59, at 3; see also Vicki W. Kramer, 
Alison M. Konrad & Sumru Erkut, Critical Mass on Corporate Boards: Why Three or More 
Women Enhance Governance (Wellesley Ctr. for Women, Report No. WCW 11, 2006). 
 63 Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, supra note 59, at 3. 
       64     Id. at 36.  
 65 Id.  There are studies that go the other way.  Frank Dobbin and Jiwook Jung found that 
stock price was adversely affected by the presence of women on boards. They posit that this is 
the result of investor bias.  And they find no positive effect on corporate profits.  See Frank Dob-
bin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence 
Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N. CAR. L. REV. 809 (2011). 
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Thus, the Commission has some reason to expect that greater gender 
equality on corporate boards will be good for business. 
The study also gives some support to the conclusion that gender- 
integrated boards’ corporate action as to employment is part of what 
makes those corporations more successful in business than corpora-
tions with gender segregated boards of directors.  In the 279 personnel 
and benefits issues that these corporate boards dealt with, boards with 
dual-critical masses asked for more information 6.4% of the time, 
while boards without only asked 2.4% of the time.66  The board took 
an initiative on a personnel or benefit issue 12.2% of the time if it had 
a dual-critical mass, and 9.8% of the time if there was no dual-critical 
mass.67  
Schwaretz-Ziv’s study does not, unfortunately, include data con-
cerning the gender composition of these corporations’ workforces, nor 
does it show whether the particular personnel issues involved ques-
tions concerning the gender composition of the workforce.  There is 
good evidence, however, that gender-integrated boards of directors do 
correlate with the greater representation of women at all levels of an 
employer’s workforce.68  A study based on 2011 data from nine Euro-
pean countries concluded that there is a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the representation of women on corporate executive 
committees (not boards of directors) and the overall rate of employ-
ment of women.69  The percentage of women on these executive com-
mittees runs from 21% in Sweden to only 3% in Germany, and aver-
ages 10% overall.70  The average of women on corporate boards is 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Does the Gender of Directors Matter?, supra note 59, at 46 tbl. 4. 
 67 Id. 
 68 A recent study of U.S. Fortune 500 companies found that corporations with gender 
equality in upper management had more demographic diversity overall than their peers.  See 
Frank Dobbin, Soohan Kim & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t Always Get What You Need: Organ-
izational Determinants of Diversity Programs, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 386, 388 (2011).  
 69 SANDRINE DEVILLARD, WIETEKE GRAVEN, EMILY LAWSON, RENEE PARADISE & 
SANDRA SANCIER-SULTAN, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, WOMEN MATTER 2012: MAKING THE 
BREAKTHROUGH 5 (2012), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/ 
latest_thinking/women_matter [hereinafter MAKING THE BREAKTHROUGH].  The level of statis-
tical significance is r = 0.63.  Id.  The seven countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  
There is, however, evidence that gender-integrated boards will lead to gender-integrated or-
ganizations.  The key is whether corporate leadership insists on organization-wide integration 
and holds lower level managers accountable to enforce integration.  Symbolic measures that are 
de-coupled from the day-to-day functioning of the organization do not by themselves produce 
change. See Soohan Kim, Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Progressive Corporations at Work: 
The Case of Diversity Programs, 36 REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 171 (2012).  It is questionable 
whether legally imposed integration will produce a positive impact for women workers through-
out the corporation for which they work.  
 70 MAKING THE BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 68, at 6. 
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17% overall, with a high of 35% in Norway and a low of 5% in Italy.71  
The participation rate of women in the workforce in Italy is about 
50%, the lowest among the nine countries.72  It also has the lowest per-
centage of women on executive committees and corporate boards; 6% 
and 5% respectively.73  Sweden has an 80% participation rate of 
women in the labor market,74 a 21% participation rate on executive 
committees, and a 25% participation rate on corporate boards.75  
In sum, there is some reasonable basis for the Commission to 
claim that, in general, the Directive will be good for business and for 
gender equality in employment for those corporations that have gen-
der integrated boards of directors.  
IV. THE DIRECTIVE AND “AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,” U.S. STYLE 
What is most surprising about the Directive from the perspective 
of the United States is that it was proposed and has, so far, made it 
through the decision making by the EU Commission.  While not with-
out pushback, a majority of the 27 EU Commissioners voted to adopt 
the Directive.  It seems unlikely such a bold proposal would even be 
made here.  The issue appears to be much less contentious in the EU 
than it would be in the United States.  That may in part be because in 
the United States race-based affirmative action has been such an ex-
tremely hot button, politicized issue for an extended period.76  It is 
possible that affirmative action for women would be somewhat less 
contentious, although affirmative action for women has also been the 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id.  
 72 REPORT ON PROGRESS ON EQUALITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN IN 2010: THE 
GENDER BALANCE IN BUSINESS LEADERSHIP 18 (2011), available at 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6562&langId=en [hereinafter GENDER BALANCE IN 
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP] 
 73 MAKING THE BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 68, at 6. 
 74 GENDER BALANCE IN BUSINESS LEADERSHIP, supra note 71, at 18. 
 75 MAKING THE BREAKTHROUGH, supra note 68, at 6.  The substantial range of difference 
among these countries is, no doubt, the consequence of significant cultural, economic and politi-
cal differences that persist.  One major cause for the differences is how these different countries 
deal with work/family balance issues.  “A major reason for women’s low employment rates is the 
challenge of reconciling work, family and private life.  The labour market participation of moth-
ers is 11.5 p.p. lower than that of women without children, while the rate for fathers is 8.5 p.p. 
higher than that for men without children.”  GENDER BALANCE IN BUSINESS LEADERSHIP, supra 
note 71, at 6.  There is a strong correlation between women’s position in the workplace and the 
support the government provides for families of r = 0.52.  MAKING THE BREAKTHROUGH, supra 
note 68, at 6.  The level of government support is determined by the average of the number of 
children in child care, the government expenditure on family/children as a percentage of GDP, 
and the proportion of men working part-time.  Id. 
 76 The Supreme Court most recently addressed race-based affirmative action in Fisher v. 
University of Texas, 570 U.S.     (2013), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-345_l5gm.pdf.  The Court remanded the case for 
further fact-finding on what constitutes a ‘critical mass’ of students of color.  
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subject of litigation.  In Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa 
Clara County,77 an unsuccessful male candidate for promotion of the 
position of a road dispatcher brought a Title VII action, claiming that 
by promoting a woman pursuant to an affirmative action plan, the 
defendant had committed sex discrimination.78  In determining the 
legality of the defendant’s affirmative action plan, the Court applied 
its earlier analysis of affirmative action in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber.
79  Like Johnson, Weber was a Title VII case but the 
issue involved an affirmative action plan based on race.  Such a plan 
would not violate Title VII if it was designed “to eliminate manifest 
racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories,”80 was a 
temporary measure, and did not “unnecessarily trammel the interests 
of the white employees.”81  Both Johnson and Weber generated heated 
dissents.  A subsequent case, Piscataway School Board v. Taxman,82 
that involved the use of race as a tiebreaker along the lines of how the 
Directive would work, was settled off the Court’s docket because of 
fears that the Court would overturn Johnson and Weber.83  The permis-
sible range of positive action allowed by the Directive is much nar-
rower than would be possible in the United States, at least under the 
relatively lenient test established in Weber and Johnson.  Affirmative 
action is not limited to tiebreaker situations. 
Several aspects arising out of the Directive resonate with the con-
stitutional equal protection issues involved in affirmative action in the 
United States.  The Directive accepts the notion that a “critical mass” 
of women on a board would be established if at least 40% of its out-
side directors were women.  In Grutter v. Bollinger,84 the University of 
Michigan Law School was successful in defending its affirmative ac-
tion admissions plan’s use of race by claiming that a “critical mass” of 
people of color was necessary to meet its objective of increased educa-
tional diversity.  In the oral argument of Fisher, the major focus of the 
questioning addressed the issue of how to define “critical mass.”85  The 
EU Commission did not appear to have the difficulty that the United 
                                                                                                                           
 77 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 78 Although the defendant was a state actor subject to the constitution’s equal protection 
clause, the case was decided on statutory grounds.  Id. 
 79 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 80 Id. at 197. 
 81 Id. at 208. 
 82 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 83 See Michael J. Zimmer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges Five Bullets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 229, 229, 233 (1998). 
 84 539 U.S. 306, 340-43 (2003). 
 85 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345 (argued Oct. 
10, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-345.pdf.  
The phrase appears some 48 times in the transcript.  
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States Supreme Court had with the term.  Further, like the justifica-
tion that the Directive would be good for business, the law school’s 
use of race in admissions was justified in Grutter as being necessary to 
improve the functioning of business in a globalized economy.86 
Finally, the Directive is not phrased in gender explicit terms; in-
stead, it characterizes the issue as one of the “over-” and “under-
represented” genders.  Despite the potential separation from the use 
of the terms “women” or “men,” or “male” or “female,” the Directive 
appears to treat the two sets of terms the same.  In the United States, 
at least so far, the constitutional equal protection analysis would be 
quite different.  If the classification under attack involved gender ex-
plicit terms, then so-called middle level scrutiny would be applied; a 
gender explicit law will be upheld if it is “substantially related to an 
important government purpose,” and not merely a legitimate one.87  
Where the law is not phrased in terms of sex or race, then “rational 
basis” analysis is used, so it will be upheld if it is rationally related to 
any legitimate government purpose.88  A background issue in Fisher 
was that the state law mandated that the top ten percent of each Texas 
high school be automatically admitted to the University.89  The top ten 
percent law was enacted for the purpose of admitting some students 
of color to the University without explicitly using race because the 
public high schools are extremely segregated by race.90  Under prevail-
ing law, the top ten percent law would be analyzed for equal protec-
tion purposes using the lowest level, rational relationship scrutiny.91 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308.  Another justification was the necessity of an integrated officer 
corps in the military. 
 87 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Where a law explicitly uses race, strict 
scrutiny applies so the law will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling govern-
mental interest.  Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
 88 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
 89 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 227 (5th Cir. 2011). The affirmative action admis-
sions policy attacked in Fisher uses race explicitly to further enhance educational diversity. 
 90 Hope Yen, Supreme Court Weighs in on Race with Affirmative Action, Voting Rights 
Cases, HUFFPOLITICS BLOG (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/01/supreme-
court-race_n_2991460.html (“The university automatically grants admission to the top 10% of 
students in each of the state's high schools. That helps bring in students of different backgrounds 
because Texas high schools are highly racially segregated, reflecting decades of segregated 
neighborhoods.”). 
 91 Gender and race neutral laws are not entirely exempt from meaningful equal protection 
review since such a law might still be proven to be discriminatory if the challenger can prove it 
had a “discriminatory purpose.”  That would require proof that the legislature “selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group.”  Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) 
(quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Commission’s adoption of the Directive is a bold step for-
ward.  It will be quite interesting to see if the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament adopt it.  If they do and the Directive becomes EU 
law, the member states will have two years to modify their corporate 
laws to put in place the 40% goal of board seats to be filled by the 
underrepresented sex, generally women.  Presumably, even before the 
member states act to harmonize their corporate laws with the Direc-
tive, corporations listed on stock exchanges in the EU will have a 
strong incentive to meet the 40% goal by the end of 2020.  If they suc-
ceed by that time, the corporations will be able to avoid making any 
changes to their board appointment procedures.  If, however, they do 
not achieve that goal, then the corporate laws under which they are 
organized would mandate the adoption of transparent appointment 
procedures that require the corporations to use pre-established, clear, 
neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria.  It will be interesting 
to see whether the incentive of avoiding the adoption of merit proce-
dures is strong enough so that few corporations will be their subject 
due to successful voluntary compliance. 
Expanding gender equality on corporate boards is justifiable for 
its own sake.  The Commission further justifies the Directive on the 
ground that it will be good for gender equality in employment gener-
ally as well as good for business.  There are some studies that support 
that happening.   The move of large EU corporations to expand the 
representation of women on their boards of directors will provide new 
opportunities to evaluate those claims.  
A proposal such as this seems to be far off the radar in the 
United States.92  This Directive is another example of how the EU has 
passed the US by in terms of moving toward greater gender equality. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 The Securities and Exchange Commission, however, has adopted rules requiring public 
companies to consider “diversity in the process by which candidates for director are considered 
for nomination” to their boards of directors, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About Risk, 
Compensation and Corporate Governance, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-268.htm, and a rule requiring them “to disclose how 
they view diversity with respect to their boards”.  Luis A. Aguilar, Speech by SEC Commissioner: 
Board Diversity: Why it Matters and How to Improve It, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 4, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110410laa.htm.  
